Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue

The coordination of strategies in a cooperative game, when some players decide to act together, is the basis of the partnership notion. Nevertheless, in some situations, it may be more convenient to form an effective coalition or alliance. In this work, we consider the Banzhaf semivalue and use it to discuss the convenience to form either partnerships or alliances, especially in simple games. Throughout the paper, some mathematical properties of the Banzhaf semivalue, in relation with the partnership formation, are derived.     

Coordination mechanisms for inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems

This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than under centralized control. To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented: one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed.     

非紧超凸度量空间中的一个新的极大元定理及其对抽象经济的应用

在非紧超凸度量空间中建立了一个新的极大元定理.作为应用，获得了连续选择及其不动点定理和一个Browder-Fan不动点定理.最后，新建了非紧超凸度量空间中的定性对策和抽象经济的平衡点存在定理.     

An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy

This paper proposes a computational game-theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place at the end of the period covered by the Kyoto protocol. These negotiations could lead to a self-enforcing agreement on a burden sharing scheme given the necessary global emissions limit that will be imposed when the real extent of climate change is known. The model assumes a non-cooperative behavior of the parties except for the fact that they will be collectively committed to reach a target on total cumulative emissions by the year 2050. The concept of normalized equilibrium, introduced by J.B. Rosen for concave games with coupled constraints, is used to characterize a family of dynamic equilibrium solutions in an m-player game where the agents are (groups of) countries and the payoffs are the welfare gains obtained from a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The model deals with the uncertainty about climate sensitivity by computing an S-adapted equilibrium. These equilibria are computed using an oracle-based method permitting an implicit definition of the payoffs to the different players, obtained through simulations performed with the global CGE model GEMINI-E3. Partly supported by GICC (French Ministry of Ecology), TOCSIN (EU-044287) and the Swiss-NSF NCCR-Climate program of the Swiss NSF. For helpful comments and discussions, we thank A. Bernard, P. Thalmann, and the anonymous referee.     

舰艇对抗微分对策建模研究

编队舰艇对抗攻击瞬时运动状态过程的完整描述是一个尚未很好解决的技术难点，本就驱逐舰对多艘导弹快挺对抗攻击建模问题进行了研究，建立了攻击时间尽可能短的定量微分对策模型，并给出了具体实现方法，中模型和方法可为实时舰艇作战指挥系统的研制、开发提供技术支持及理论依据。     

基于利益相关者合作博弈的决策优化与收益分配

企业剩余既是利益相关合作的成果也是争夺的对象。本首先用TOPSIS方法描述利益相关参与企业群体决策，并对决策群体给出的多种方案进行优化的过程。然后运用Shapley值，计算优化方案中不同利益相关合作的影响指数，再通过评估获得不同利益相关的分配收益。     

防范道德风险的博弈分析和契约设计

运用不完全信息动态博弈的理论，建立了一个防范道德风险的博弈模型．给出了该博弈的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡．在此基础上给出了基于最优博弈策略的契约的具体形式。而这种基于博弈论的契约可以克服有成本的状态验证模型(CSV)及经典激励理论中承诺的可信性问题。     

基于利率市场化的银行贷款竞争导向定价策略研究

本文着重对两个银行之间竞争导向定价策略博弈行为进行了分析，认为在利率管制条件下，银行难以运用利率杠杆在信贷市场进行有效竞争；利率市场化之后，监管者不再对利率进行约束，银行信贷竞争的广度和深度都会随之加大。因此价格竞争将是银行信贷市场竞争的常态。     

A dynamic approach to the Shapley value based on associated games

We propose a dynamic process leading to the Shapley value of TU games or any solution satisfying Inessential Game (IG) and Continuity (CONT), based on a modified version of Hamiache's notion of an associated game. The authors are very grateful to William Thomson and two anonymous referees for valuable comments which much improve the paper. They provide better statements and proofs of several major results than the original ones.